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REVOLUTION-A SPIRITUAL PHENOMENON: A 
STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 
Henry E. Strakosch* 
It seems fitting, when paying homage to a scholar who has 
always stressed his allegiance to the original law of the Christian 
civilization of the Occident, the law of the Old Testament and the 
Prophets, to describe in this short study, in a kind of Socratic dialec-
tic, a system of thought which represents the opposite point of view. 
For when we see the law against the backdrop of a denial of its 
ontological value and the social consequences of this denial-only 
then does law arise in the full grandeur of its benevolent dominion. 
And the tension between lawful authority and power not limited by 
law, has lost nothing of its strength, since a philosophy of the latter 
arose in late antiquity. On the contrary, this tension has reassumed 
a special virulence in our own time which shows in its social stresses 
an often striking analogy to those far removed days. 
The malaise of the modem world seems to be doubt in the 
legitimacy of authority as such. The obligatory nature of law and 
the right-indeed the duty-of authority to enforce it, are increas-
ingly being regarded as a diminution of personal freedom. This 
"skeptical view of legality" has its root in a denial of the idea of 
order as the integration of the more particular in the more universal, 
or, speaking in social categories, of the community as a structure in 
which the individual parts, while preserving their integral identity, 
are yet forming a "Oneness" through their mutual, functional de-
pendence. As a consequence of the waning of a sense of order, society 
is undergoir..g a process of dissolution into an undifferentiated mass. 
The only cohesion which remains when the process is sufficiently far 
gone, is the total subjection of each social group, and every individ-
ual, to a self-styled leader or small minority, purporting to represent 
the ideal unity for all. This is the trend which culminates in the 
phenomenon of the totalitarian revolution. In the words of a modem 
English historian, all the great revolutions of modem history are 
really only one revolution. 1 I will try to show that this revolution is 
not simply an attack on an established authority, but a phenome-
non sui generis, i.e., an attack on order as such, based on an identifi-
able metaphysical position. This position is Gnosticism: the denial, 
* Honorary Professor of History, Salzburg University; M.A., Sidney University. 
1. A. COBBAN, IN SEARCH OF HUMANITY 192 (1960). 
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on ontological grounds, of every vestige of value to anything encom-
passed in the natural order; a radical and utopian spiritualism 
which leads to a full divorce of positive law from any ethical norm. 
Gnosticism, which since Hans Jonas's basic2 and Eric Voege-
lin's new3 approach to the ideological tension in modern history 
must be understood as the negative pole in the magnetic field of 
occidential civilization, has its origin in a phenomenon which in two 
thousand years has lost nothing of its social significance. If we lift 
the phenomenon of alienation from its Marxist context we find that 
alienation occurs when man suddenly discovers, in an environment 
to which he seemed to belong as a formative force, a lawfulness 
proper to it and independent of him. Social change can then be~ome 
part of a disturbance in the sphere of personal identity and, through 
the feeling of becoming an alien in a wonted world, social change 
itself is lifted on to an altogether different and higher plane of spirit-
ual significance. This opens a new and qualitatively different field 
of social tension. 4 
This break in political, social and indeed spiritual continuity 
occurred in the ancient world when the classical polis was absorbed; 
first into the great Hellenistic kingdoms, and later into the Roman 
empire. The polis, the city, had been "home" to a Greek in a syn-
thesis of social and spiritual significance no longer understood by us, 
who are accustomed to the state as a protective hedge around our 
individual existence.5 
The polis was a natural phenomenon of a higher order; it came into 
being to make life possible, but it continues in existence in order to 
make life happy, excellent and as nearly perfect as possible ... the 
city is a higher being of divine power. Basically the polis was for the 
Greek his religion.8 
This synthesis of a natural and a spiritual home, this full inte-
gration of the individual in his social environment, broke down 
2. 1 H. JONAS, GNOSIS UND SPXTANTIKER GEIST (3d ed. 1964); Jonas, Gnoticism and 
Modern Nihilism, 19 SOCIAL RESEARCH 430 (1952). 
3. E. VoEGELIN, THE NEw SCIENCE OF POLITICS (1952); E. VoEGELIN, WISSENSCHAFT, Pou-
TIK UND GNOSIS (1959). 
4. Cf., Gehlen, Ober die Geburt der Freiheit aus der Entfremdung, 40 ARCHIV f()R RECHT 
UND SozIALPHILOSOPHIE 338 (1952), contains the example of Ficht~-who stands at the begin-
ning of the modem theories of alienation-lifting the "freedom-enthusiasm" of the Jacobins 
into the struggle of the "I" against necessity. 
5. Cf. J. BURCKHARDT, GRIECHISCHE KULTURGERCHICHTE 80 (1898); GNOSIS UND 
SPATANTIKER, supra note 2, at 240. 
6. Id. 
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when the spiritual element ceased to be capable of being grasped in 
the clear light of rational understanding. The identity of the "pol-
ites" with man in the full stature of his rational self-possession was 
losing its meaning when the small groups of active citizens who had 
been the polis became the mere subjects of the ruler in a kingdom 
of a distinctly Oriental type, with an authority deduced from uni-
versalist, mystical and often esoteric ideas. At the same time the 
masses of slaves and aliens who hitherto had led an anonymous 
social existence on the margin of the city-state and had been the 
mere passive objects of the great events in history, began to assume 
political consciousness and found a new sense of identity in the 
spreading mystery cults and similar movements. Even the nobility 
and the patriciate, perhaps from a sense of satiety and "tiredness 
of civilization," could not resist the attraction of a new world-view 
and lost all feeling for their own place in the cosmic order of values, 
thereby accelerating the process of dissolution of the structure of 
society.7 
A gradual waning of a feeling of "being-at-home" in the actual, 
"here and now" existing world of the natural and social orders, gave 
rise to a spiritual crisis of the first order. A new problem moved into 
the center of personal and social consciousness, the problem of the 
incommensurability of both the "I" and the cosmic order. The ques-
tion of the direct historical filiation of an idea, which was destined 
to become the touchstone of any existentially relevant philosophy, 
has remained unanswered to this day. This is hardly surprising, for 
we are here facing one of the primordial questions of human exist-
ence as such. It appears in the pronouncement of Genesis: "God 
made man in his likeness," which in its inimitable conciseness 
places man in the natural order as well as giving him a supernatural 
status. The explosive power of the. idea of man being at one, at the 
same time a part and a whole, belonging to the community and 
transcending it, had remained latent in world-views such as those 
held by the Greeks of the classical period. There it had been 
counter-balanced by a basic faith in a cosmic order in which the 
more particular was elevated into the being of the more universal 
by an immanent process of ontological growth towards perfection. 
Only with the waning of the credibility of a cosmic order in the 
existentially vital sphere of social relations, did the problem of man 
arise in all its stark grandeur. 
7. GNOSIS UND SPATANTIKER, supra note 2, at 69. 
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Late antiquity gave a number of answers to the problem of the 
incommensurability of the "I" and the cosmic order. Two of those, 
Stoicism and Neo-Platonism, became important elements in the 
formation of the spiritual and intellectual climate of Occidental 
civilization, but they remained so fast bound to the classical con-
cept of an immanent world-order that they were incapable of pro-
viding a real solution to the problem of man in an order which 
transcended man, and which he transcended. The other two, Chris-
tianity and Gnosticism, met the problem head-on and became, in 
their opposing answers, the positive and the negative pole of history 
in the new chapter which opened when the city-state disappeared 
below the horizon of historical reality. We are here most concerned 
with Gnosticism and a few words on Chrisitianity must suffice in 
order to show the full extent of the gnostic denial. 
In Christianity a full synthesis is made of the natural and the 
supernatural order, not by virtue of an immanent and ontological 
process, but through a free act of grace by God. God became man, 
and thus man, though remaining rooted in the natural order, was 
also elevated to the supernatural position of one who participates 
in the divine nature.8 The significance of this metaphysical reality 
in the social sphere was momentous. Man was now able to grant the 
community an ontological priority without losing his identity, i.e. 
without being absorbed by the community. His immediate link with 
the Absolute elevated him above the community, though in the 
natural order he remained a part of it. Thus the Greek concept of 
order, i.e., the ontological priority of the more universal over the 
more particular, was preserved, but so was the value of each man 
as an individual. The social and legal philosophy of Occidental civi-
lization was based on the idea of man being a part of the community 
and yet, as a person, transcending it in ontological value. 
The answer of Gnosticism to the problem of the autonomy of 
man in a universe of order was the opposite of that given by Chris-
tianity. Gnosticism professed a radical pessimism which deprived 
the social order of any value for the human person and therefore also 
rejected the idea that man can find in the social order a way towards 
his personal fulfillment. The metaphysical root of this radical denial 
was the idea of an unbridgeable gap between the natural world and 
the Absolute. The god of Gnosticism was transcendent to the natu-
8. "Christum Dominum nostrum . . . Qui . . . est elevatus in caelum, ut nos div initatis 
suae tribueret esse participes ." Preface of the Mass of the Ascension, ROMAN MISSAL 276-77 
(Benziger Bros. ed. 1964) . 
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ral order. In that sense he resembled the God of the Old and the New 
Testament rather than the Greek idea of the immanence of the 
divine in the cosmic o:r:der. But the god of Gnosticism, in stark 
contrast to the God of Christianity, lacked that attribute which 
elevated the created world to the spiritual and supernatural order: 
he was not Love. In a strict dualism, the world of created things 
became thus the antithesis of the Absolute, and any conciliation 
between spirit and matter, i.e., any idea of a world-order capable 
of elevating man to a status transcending his natural self, was con-
demned as a metaphysical scandal. 
Gnostic dualism is consistent and radical; the god who created 
the world is in gnostic writing reduced to the status of the Platonic 
demiurge, "who had created creations outside life"9 and gives ex-
pression to his remorse over ontological original sin by exclaiming: 
"who has befooled me that I became a fool and threw the soul into 
the body. " 10 The world thus became a sphere dominated by hostile 
powers; it is the existential reality of the essential opposition be-
tween God and the world; the relation between God and the world 
is that of light and darkness.11 The sense of "at-homeness" in the 
world, so characteristic of the Greek of the classical period, has been 
turned into an appalling existential insecurity, man's fear of the 
world and of himself .12 
Gnostic man sees the world as essentially alien and evil and so 
intense is this feeling of-in a characteristic gnostic expres-
sion-being "thrown" into the world, 13 that he cannot face the 
world, as for instance the Indian does, with indifference, but only 
with a positive, metaphysically grounded feeling of hatred. 14 Thus 
does fear turn into defiance.15 This basic attitude of revolt is 
squarely expressed in a gnostic version of the Prometheus myth. 
There Zeus, the adversary of Prometheus, is turned, in a consciously 
blasphemic interpretation, from the highest keeper of order to a 
power alien to man, coercing him with a fateful force.16 Irenaeus of 
Lyon, the great Christian thinker who regarded Gnosticism as the 
most dangerous enemy of Christianity, did not fail to point out that 
9. GNOSIS UND SPATANTIKER, supra note 2, at 106. 
10. Id. at 107. 
11. Id. at 146. 
12. Id. at 143. 
13. Id. at 107. 
14. Id. at 150. 
15. H. JONAS, Zw1scttEN NICHTS UND EwIGKEIT 12 (1963). 
16. GNOSIS UND SPATANTIKER, supra note 2, at 218. 
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this was the exact antithesis of the story of creation in Genesis which 
concludes with the words, "And God saw all that he had made and 
found it very good."17 
When we consider the consequences of this metaphysics of ali-
enation in the social life of man, we find them leading to a radical 
rejection of the idea of order. That is so because the idea of order is 
based on an equally fundamental optimism in which the concept of 
an inherent opposition between the identity of the self and the unity 
of the whole has no place. Order, irt the social sense relevant here, 
is the integration of the value proper to each into a value proper to 
the community as a whole, or in other words it means that plurality 
and unity are different aspects of the same reality, that one presup-
poses the other. As Aristotle once said: one cannot make a concert 
on a single note. In a metaphysics of order the social whole is there-
fore not a diminution, but on the contrary the perfection of personal 
freedom. In the metaphysics of radical pessimism, the opposite is 
true: law is for Gnosticism nothing but tyranny and even "mine" 
and "thine" are only concepts introduced by an extrinsic power 
without any morally binding force. 18 
A social philosophy emanating from gnostic thought will there-
fore, true to its basic thesis of an unconquerable opposition between 
the world of nature and the realm of the spirit, reject the idea, which 
is so firmly rooted in Greek and Christian thought, that the social 
order, precisely because it is an order, is an indispensable medium 
for the perfection of man; Personal fulfillment can, in gnostic 
thought, only arise from being elevated beyond the social order 
through a direct inspiration by the divine spirit. That, however, is 
only granted to a small number of individuals, the elect, who thus 
represent the only ontological fulfillment accessible to mankind 
as a whole. Gnosticism distinguishes sharply between the 
Pneumatikos, spiritual man who is elevated by a direct inspiration 
above the common run of mankind, and "psychic man" who will 
never be able to free himself from the bondage of his natural exist-
ence.19 
A social philosophy which rejected the institutional framework 
of society as a mere means of coercion and a denial of spirit; which 
proclaimed a freedom which rises above the natural order and 
within a small circle of the elect gives substance to a perfection 
17. Cf. L. BOROS, DENKEN IN DER BEGEGNUNG 37 (1973). 
18. 1 C. ANDRESSEN, DIE GNos1s 28 (Zeugnisse der Kirchenvater ed. 1969). 
19. GNOSIS UND SPATANTIKER, supra note 2, at 145. 
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inaccessible to the multitude-this irrational and utopian creed 
became the fountainhead of the revolution, that great antagonist, 
in European history, of law and order. 
The irrational and utopian note of the revolution remained con-
stant through its long and eventful history. The revolution's gnostic 
claim to be a redemptive act-not however of a natural order but 
from it-gave its denial of the legitimacy of established order the 
enthusiasm and dynamic force of a movement whose origin lies 
within the realm of the spirit. The genuine revolutionary always saw 
in a total reversal of the social order his real obligation to his utopian 
ideal. Burke quotes Rabaud de St. Etienne, a Girondist who was 
executed in 1793, as saying in the Assembly, a year earlier: 
Tous les establissemens en France couronnent le malheur du 
peuple: pour le rendre heureux il faut le renouveler; changer ses 
idees; changer ses loix; changer ses moeurs; . . changer les 
hommes; changer les choses; changer les mots ... tout detruire; 
oui, tout detruire; puisque tout est a recreer. 20 
Quite consistently, the revolutionary sees his most dangerous adver-
sary in the reformer who wants to improve an existing order instead 
of setting out to destroy it. When Tsar Alexander II had shown his 
readiness to change the autocratic regime of Russia into a constitu-
tional one, so as to allow the social stresses which had arisen from 
the liberation of the serfs to find their own balance, he was "sent-
enced to death" by the Nihilists. And the sentence was carried out, 
as it were, in the last moment; the emperor was murdered on the 
day when the new constitution had been approved for publication.21 
As an historical phenomenon, the revolution followed-like a 
subterranean stream-the whole course of Occidental civilization. 
Whenever an order had become unfunctional as a result of changes 
in political or social or economic conditions, whenever the coercive 
power exercised by the institutions of a social order had lost its 
functionality and its legitimacy, the revolution broke through a 
ground which had become too brittle to hold it and came forward 
with its enthusiastic appeal for a total abrogation of order as such. 
20. The discontent of the people is crowned by the French establishment; in order 
to make them happy the social order must be rebuilt: the ideas of the people must 
be changed; change their laws; change their morals; ... change men; change things; 
change words; ... destroy everything; yes, destroy everything; because everything 
must be recreated. (Eds. trans.) 
E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 164 n.1 (1964) . 
21. Cf. B . PARES, A HISTORY OF RUSSIA 441 (1955). 
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This type of revolutionary assault remained constant throughout 
the length and width of European history. It occurred in the middle 
ages when the Manichaean movements of Italy and the Provence 
rejected in toto the authority of a visible Church whose institutions 
had become too closely integrated with those of the secular com-
munity. The sweeping attack on the structure of society in the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries began to unfold when the nobil-
ity, while retaining their privileges, had lost the function of feudal 
government and regional defence, so that their exalted position had 
become deprived of its legitimacy. And the work of destruction of 
the institutional pattern of European society began with the aboli-
tion of the Monarchy in France, when the king's power no longer 
proved adequate to take care of the most pressing needs of govern-
ment. 
The revolution remained victorious when the patent unfunc-
tionality of an established order lent credibility to its denial of the 
legitimacy of order as such. But in every single case, even when its 
victory seemed complete, the revolution ended in defeat. The his-
tory of revolution shows the inner contradiction and the self-
destructive dynamic of its utopian idealism in the inability of the 
revolution to survive its own victory. Whenever the revolution has 
succeeded in destroying an established order it is faced with the task 
of stabilizing its victory in institutional forms. But that means that 
a new order has to be built on the ruins of the old one. This contra-
dicts the basic claim of the revolution and reverses the trend that 
has led it to victory. The ensuing struggle within the revolutionary 
movement gives the latter its characteristic note of terrorism. In 
order to prevent a sliding of the revolutionary enthusiasm into a 
non-revolutionary mode of reform, the revolution is forced to pro-
claim a not completed, and never to be completed, war against the 
"inner enemy." The circle of this alleged threat has to be drawn 
sufficiently wide to allow a battle, the end of which would also mean 
the end of the revolution, to go on indefinitely. The "inner ene-
mies," the Gi-devants of the French Revolution, the Jews and other 
lesser races in Nazism and the Capitalists and Imperalists of the 
Communist ideological vocabulary, play an indispensable role in 
the factual history of every revolution. They keep its irrational radi-
calism at its boiling point. 
But the process of radicalization cannot go on for ever. Even the 
greatest wave breaks when it hits the shore. Under the pressure of 
the practical needs of government the revolution is forced to aban-
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don its depreciation of the social order and must thus accept the 
factual denial of its original pledge. The revolution then turns into 
a stage, full of human tragedy, when many of its most enthusiastic 
supporters are being sacrificed to the demands of political expe-
diency. Rakovsky, one of the old Bolsheviks of the 1920's showed a 
true understanding of the tragic motif of the revolution, when he 
lamented "the inevitable disintegration of the party of revolution 
after its victory."22 And so we find the generals succeeding the genu-
ine revolutionaries in the English civil war, Napoleon issuing his 
preemptory proclamation after the coup d'etat ofBrumaire in which 
he declared that the Revolution was over, and Stalin converting 
Communism in Russia which for Lenin and Trotsky had been the 
first stage of the world-revolution and nothing else, into Commun-
ism for Russia, i.e. as a means to build up the power of the state. 
However, the fact that the revolution after a deluge of destruc-
tion achieves nothing but its own defeat, does not minimize its 
importance as a constant feature of European history. On the con-
trary, the true dynamic of European history can be shown to lie in 
the opposition between order, expressed in a law, possessing a posi-
tive coercive power but derived from norms of objective and univer-
sal validity, and the revolution, which rejects the latter and there-
fore feels free to defy the former. And so we must, unpalatable as it 
may seem, recognize the march of the revolution in the malaise of 
our own period. 
The conditions for the rise of a revolutionary movement have 
been present since the First World War. At that time, under the 
pressure of the gigantic exertions demanded from the people by 
modern warfare, the state began to change its character. The con-
cept of sovereignty, upon which the state had been based since the 
medieval oecumene, had sunk below the horizon of historical reality 
in the sixteenth century and was losing its validity. Sovereignty had 
meant, at least on the Continent where Common Law had been 
abolished by the enlightened absolutism of the eighteenth century, 
that the state was capable of creating law, in contrast to the medie-
val prince who was only thought capable of applying a law derived 
from universally valid norms. But on the other hand, sovereignty 
had also meant the strict limitation of the power of the state to a 
well-defined territory. This limitation, expressed in the axiomatic 
principle that the state could not interfere in the internal affairs of 
22. 1. DEUTSCHER, THE PROPHET UNARMED 435 (1959). 
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another state, had neutralized the threat of international anarchy 
implied by the idea of a state standing above the law. However, 
when the state had assumed during the war a far-reaching power of 
control over many aspects of social and economic life, this could 
only be justified by a synthesis of "state" and "society" which was 
unknown in the nineteenth century and would have been repugnant 
to its liberal individualism. Thus began-or rather brought to a 
politically active stage-the process of giving the state an ideologi-
cal context. The war which had begun as a clash of two groups of 
great powers received now the character of a crusade for democracy. 
But a state, whose principle of cohesion was ideology, could no 
longer accept the limitation imposed on it by the old-style concept 
of sovereignty; if it wanted to remain true to its postulated raison 
d'etre it had to strive to gain through the power of its institutions a 
universal acceptance of its ideology. A contradiction between a prin-
ciple of limitation and a principle of expansion had thus arisen 
within the state. It made itself felt immediately in the peace treaties 
which showed a complete lack of political or ideological consistency. 
In the last half-century the "ideologization" of the state has 
made rapid progress. In the sphere of international relations this 
had led to an intensified modification of state-sovereignty. The new 
type of "alliances" shows a closer integration of states than one that 
is still compatible with sovereignty in the strict sense of the term. 
Also the internal structure of the state is undergoing a process of 
modification. Political parties separated by an ideological gulf find 
it difficult to recognize in each other the legitimacy of their respec-
tive trends. This tends to weaken the basis of parliamentary govern-
ment and threatens to turn the "dialogue" within parliament into 
a struggle for power fought outside the precincts of the legislative 
body. This deterioration of parliamentary government has given rise 
to the phenomenon of the "new feudalism," i.e., the growing inde-
pendence from the state of powerful organizations, such as trade 
unions or capitalist corporations with widespread international af-
filiations. In the international sphere as well as in the internal 
sphere of government the state is thus undergoing a transformation 
which is liable to create a skeptical doubt over the legitimacy of the 
coercive power still exercised by its institutions and a general repu-
diation of authority. That, however, is precisely the situation in 
which the perennial challenge of the revolution to order as such can 
be raised again with a fair chance of success. 
The twentieth century has witnessed the rise of a revolutionary 
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movement of unparalleled strength. The totalitarian revolution in 
its Fascist or its Communist form has spread over large parts of the 
globe. And if we consider the true import of the crisis of government 
that Western society is facing, with the state losing its function of 
order, we must conclude that the revolution has not spent its force. 
We can no longer cherish the illusion so prevalent in the nineteenth 
century, and not fully abandoned today, that social stresses will 
resolve themselves by an immanent process of balance and counter-
balance. Nor can we expect the welfare state to provide the institu-
tional medium for a reconciliation between a market economy and 
state-dirigism, when the state itself is increasingly losing its power 
of control. The current world-wide inflation may well herald the 
burial of a pious hope. 
If we are prepared to continue the struggle for the preservation 
of a law which gives suum cuique in the real sense of guaranteeing 
the identity of each in the social order, we must accept the stern 
reality of a continued systematic attack on the very foundations of 
Occidental civilization. The revolution may appear in different 
forms, conditioned by historical circumstances, but it always repre-
sents the same spiritual force of denial of order and absolute repu-
diation of the rule of law. A clear understanding of the revolution 
as a force bent by its own inherent trend on destruction plus an 
equally clear demarcation between changes in the institutional pat-
tern of authority and the rejection of authority as such, is now more 
than ever a condition of the peaceful evolution of society. The pres-
ent article may be regarded as an attempt to contribute through an 
uncovering of the spiritual roots of the revolution, to an understand-
ing upon which depends the survival of personal values in the social 
order, at a time when that order seems threatened from without 
and, even more, from within. 
13
Strakosch: History of Ideas
Published by SURFACE, 1975
